module arch.system.identity.identity;

import prelude open;

Identity Architecture¶

type OrdKey OrdKeyType :=
  mkOrdKey@{
    compare : OrdKeyType -> OrdKeyType -> Ordering;
  };

type HASH OrdKeyType Hashable :=
  mkHASH@{
    ordKey : OrdKey OrdKeyType;
    hash : Hashable -> OrdKeyType;
  };

type OrdMap (OrdKeyType : Type) (MapCon : Type -> Type) :=
  mkMap@{
    ordKey : OrdKey OrdKeyType;
    empty {A} : MapCon A;
    map {A B} : (A -> B) -> MapCon A -> MapCon B;
    insert {A} : Pair (MapCon A) (Pair OrdKeyType A) -> MapCon A;
    foldl {A B} : (Pair A B -> B) -> B -> MapCon A -> B;
    intersectWith
      {A B C} : (Pair A B -> C) -> Pair (MapCon A) (MapCon B) -> MapCon C;
    all {A} : (A -> Bool) -> MapCon A -> Bool;
  };

The base abstraction of the protocol is a knowledge-based identity interface, where the identity of an agent is defined entirely on the basis of whether or not they know some secret information.

Agents can use private information (likely randomness) to create an internal identity, from which they can derive an external identity to which it corresponds. The external identity can be shared with other parties. The agent who knows the internal identity can sign messages, which any agent who knows the external identity can verify, and any agent who knows the external identity can encrypt messages which the agent with knowledge of the internal identity can decrypt. This identity interface is independent of the particular cryptographic mechanisms, which may vary.

Identity Interface¶

Internal Identity¶

An internal identity includes private information necessary for signing and decryption. Formally, an internal identity has two parts: a Signer and a Decryptor.

Signer Juvix Type¶

A signature describing a type SignerType that can cryptographically sign (or credibly commit) to something (a Signable), forming a Commitment. Implementations should ultimately include, for example BLS keys, which should be able to sign anything that can be marshaled into a bitstring.

Properties:

• In general, every S : Signer needs a corresponding V : Verifier, and every s : SignerType needs a corresponding v : VerifierType, such that:

  • For any message m : verify v m x = (x = (sign s m))
  • for most cryptosystems, a computationally bounded adversary should not be able to approximate s knowing only v.

type Signer SignerType Signable Commitment :=
  mkSigner@{
    sign : SignerType -> Signable -> Commitment;
  };

Decryptor Juvix Type¶

A signature describing a type DecryptorType that can cryptographically decrypt something (a Ciphertext), resulting in a Plaintext (or none, if decryption fails). Implementations should ultimately include, for example, AES-256 keys, which should be able to decrypt bitstrings into anything that can be unmarshaled from a bitstring.

Properties:

• a computationally bounded adversary should not be able to approximate decrypt d without knowledge of d.

• decrypt should take polynomial time (in the size of its inputs)

• Each D : Decryptor should have a corresponding E : Encryptor, and each d : DecryptorType has a corresponding e : EncryptorType such that:

  • for all c : Ciphertext, p : Plaintext: decrypt d c = Some p iff c = encrypt e p
  • if d = e, we call this "symmetric encryption," and otherwise it's "asymmetric encryption"

type Decryptor DecryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext :=
  mkDecryptor@{
    decrypt : DecryptorType -> Ciphertext -> Option Plaintext;
  };

Internal Identity Juvix Type¶

An Internal Identity structure simply specifies everything specified by both Signer and Decryptor.

An Internal Identity structure specifies the necessary types and functions for both a Signer and a Decryptor. Implementations should ultimately include, for example, RSA private keys, which should be able to decrypt integers into anything that can be unmarshaled from a bitstring, and sign anything which can be marshaled into a bytestring to form an integer.

An internal_identity includes:

• a type SignerType that can cryptographically sign (or credibly commit) to something (a Signable), forming a Commitment.

• a type DecryptorType that can cryptographically decrypt something (a Ciphertext), resulting in a Plaintext (or none, if decryption fails).

Properties are inherited from Signer and Decryptor.

type InternalIdentity SignerType Signable Commitment DecryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext :=
  mkInternalIdentity@{
    signer : Signer SignerType Signable Commitment;
    decryptor : Decryptor DecryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext;
  };

External Identity¶

An external identity includes only public information. An external identity can verify signatures produced by an internal identity, and encrypt messages the internal identity can then decrypt. Formally, an external identity has two parts: a verifier and an Encryptor. Each is hashable: any structure specifying verifier and Encryptor types must also specify a hash function, so that external identities can be specified by hash.

Verifier Juvix Type¶

A signature describing a type VerifierType that can cryptographically verify that a Commitment (or cryptographic signature) corresponds to a given message (a Signable), and was signed by the SignerType corresponding to this VerifierType. A VerifierType can be hashed (producing a unique identifier), so a structure with signature Verifier must specify a VerifierHash structure defining a suitable hash function. Implementations should ultimately include, for example BLS identities.

Properties:

• In general, every V : Verifier needs a corresponding S : Signer, and every s : SignerType needs a corresponding v : VerifierType, such that:

  • For any message m : verify v m x = (x = (sign s m))
  • for most cryptosystems, a computationally bounded adversary should not be able to approximate s knowing only v.

type Verifier OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment :=
  mkVerifier@{
    verify : VerifierType -> Signable -> Commitment -> Bool;
    verifierHash : HASH OrdKey VerifierType;
  };

Encryptor Juvix Type¶

A signature describing a type EncryptorType that can cryptographically encrypt a Plaintext (message) to create a Ciphertext readable only by the corresponding DecryptorType. An EncryptorType can be hashed (producing a unique identifier), so a structure with signature Encryptor must specify an encryptorHash structure defining a suitable hash function. Implementations should ultimately include, for example, AES-256 keys, which should be able to decrypt bitstrings into anything that can be unmarshaled from a bitstring.

Properties:

• encrypt should take polynomial time (in the size of its inputs)

• Each E : Encryptor should have a corresponding D : Decryptor, and each d : DecryptorType has a corresponding e : EncryptorType such that:

  • for all c : Ciphertext, p : Plaintext: decrypt d c = Some p iff c = encrypt e p
  • if d = e, we call this "symmetric encryption," and otherwise it's "asymmetric encryption." In an asymmetric cryptosystem, a computationally bounded adversary should not be able to approximate d knowing only e.

type Encryptor OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext :=
  mkEncryptor@{
    encrypt : EncryptorType -> Plaintext -> Ciphertext;
    encryptorHash : HASH OrdKey EncryptorType;
  };

External Identity Juvix Type¶

An External Identity structure specifies the necessary types and functions for both a Verifier and an Encryptor. Implementations should ultimately include, for example, RSA public keys.

An external_identity includes:

• a type VerifierType that can cryptographically verify that a Commitment (or cryptographic signature) corresponds to a given message (a Signable), and was signed by the SignerType corresponding to this VerifierType.

• a type EncryptorType that can cryptographically encrypt a Plaintext (message) to create a Ciphertext readable only by the corresponding DecryptorType.

Properties are inherited from Verifier and Encryptor.

type ExternalIdentity VerifierOrdKeyType VerifierType Signable Commitment EncryptorOrdKeyType EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext :=
  mkExternalIdentity@{
    verifier : Verifier VerifierOrdKeyType VerifierType Signable Commitment;
    encryptor
      : Encryptor EncryptorOrdKeyType EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext;
  };

Identity Juvix Type¶

An Identity structure, formally, specifies all the types for corresponding internal and external identities. So, for a given Identity structure I, its VerifierType should be the type of objects that can verify Commitments produced by a corresponding object of type SignerType. Likewise, its DecryptorType should be the type of objects that can decrypt Ciphertexts produced by a corresponding object of type EncryptorType. Implementations should ultimately include, for example, RSA public / private keys sytems.

An Identity includes:

• a type SignerType that can cryptographically sign (or credibly commit) to something (an InternalSignable), forming an InternalCommitment.

• a type DecryptorType that can cryptographically decrypt something (an InternalCiphertext), resulting in an InternalPlaintext (or none, if decryption fails).

• a type VerifierType that can cryptographically verify that an ExternalCommitment (or cryptographic signature) corresponds to a given message (an ExternalSignable), and was signed by the SignerType corresponding to this VerifierType.

• a type EncryptorType that can cryptographically encrypt an ExternalPlaintext (message) to create an ExternalCiphertext readable only by the corresponding DecryptorType.

Properties are inherited from Verifier, Encryptor, Signer, and Decryptor.

type Identity SignerType InternalSignable InternalCommitment DecryptorType InternalCiphertext InternalPlaintext VerifierOrdKeyType VerifierType ExternalSignable ExternalCommitment EncryptorOrdKeyType EncryptorType ExternalPlaintext ExternalCiphertext :=
  mkIdentity@{
    internalIdentity
      : InternalIdentity
        SignerType
        InternalSignable
        InternalCommitment
        DecryptorType
        InternalPlaintext
        InternalCiphertext;
    externalIdentity
      : ExternalIdentity
        VerifierOrdKeyType
        VerifierType
        ExternalSignable
        ExternalCommitment
        EncryptorOrdKeyType
        EncryptorType
        ExternalPlaintext
        ExternalCiphertext;
  };

SignsFor Relation¶

Some identities may have the authority to sign statements on behalf of other identities. For example, Alice might grant Bob the authority to sign arbitrary messages on her behalf. We write this relationship as Bob signsFor Alice.

In general, signsFor is a partial order over identities. This means signsFor is transitive: if A signsFor B and B signsFor C, then A signsFor C. The signsFor relation becomes especially useful with regard to composed identities, discussed below.

SignsFor Evidence¶

We do not specify all the ways one might know if one identity signsFor another. In general, an Identity Engine might accept (and perhaps store) a variety of forms of evidence as proof. As one simple form of evidence, we can specify a format for signed statements from B that proves some specified A signsFor B.

Note that signsFor evidence cannot be revoked, and so a signsFor relation is not stateful: it cannot depend on the current state of, for example, a blockchain.

SignsFor Juvix Type¶

Formally, a signsFor relation requires a type of evidence, and a Verifier structure. This codifies a belief about what VerifierType's Commitments are "at least as good as" another VerifierType's. Evidence can be signed statements, proofs, or even local state about beliefs.

For example, suppose Alice wants to grant authority to Bob to sign on her behalf. Nodes who want to take this into account might accept some sort of e : Evidence, perhaps a signed statement from Alice, so that they can recognize that signsFor e (Bob, Alice).

Note that signsFor is not symmetric: signsFor e (x,y) does not imply that any z exists such that signsFor z (y,x).

type SignsFor OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Evidence :=
  mkSignsFor@{
    verifier : Verifier OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment;
    signsFor : Evidence -> Pair VerifierType VerifierType -> Bool;
  };

SignsFor Equivalence¶

We can also define a kind of identity equivalence : A signsSameAs B precisely when A signsFor B and B signsFor A. This means that (in general), if you want to sign a message as A, but for whatever reason it's cheaper to sign a message as B, it's safe to just use B instead, and vice versa.

ReadsFor Relation¶

Similar to signsFor, it is useful to sometimes note that one identity can read information encrypted to another identity. For example, suppose Alice gives her private DecryptorType to Bob, and wants to let everyone know that Bob can now read anything encrypted to Alice. Nodes who want to take this into account might accept some sort of evidence, perhaps a signed statement from Alice, so that they can recognize that Bob readsFor Alice.

Like signsFor, readsFor is a partial order over identities. This means readsFor is transitive: if A readsFor B and B readsFor C, then A readsFor C. The readsFor relation becomes especially useful with regard to composed identities, discussed below.

ReadsFor Evidence¶

We do not specify all the ways one might know if one identity readsFor another. In general, an Identity Engine might accept (and perhaps store) a variety of forms of evidence as proof. As one simple form of evidence, we can specify a format for signed statements from B that proves A readsFor B.

ReadsFor Juvix Type¶

Formally, a readsFor relation requires a type of evidence, and an Encryptor structure. This codifies a belief about what Decryptors can read other Encryptors ciphertext. Evidence can be signed statements, proofs, or even local state about beliefs.

Specifically, if a node expresses a readsFor relation, and readsFor e (x,y), then the node believes that any node knowing the decryptor corresponding to x can decrypt encrypt y p. If there is some Plaintext p such that some node knowing a decryptor corresponding to x cannot read encrypt y p, then the node's beliefs, as encoded in the readsFor relation, are incorrect.

For example, suppose Alice gives her private DecryptorType to Bob, and wants to let everyone know that Bob can now read anything encrypted to Alice. Nodes who want to take this into account might accept some sort of e : Evidence, perhaps a signed statement from Alice, so that they can recognize that readsFor e (Bob, Alice).

Note that readsFor is not symmetric: readsFor e (x,y) does not imply that any z exists such that readsFor z (y,x).

type ReadsFor (OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext Evidence : Type) :=
  mkReadsFor@{
    encryptor : Encryptor OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext;
    readsFor : Evidence -> Pair EncryptorType EncryptorType -> Bool;
  };

Equivalence¶

We can also define a kind of identity equivalence: A readsSameAs B precisely when A readsFor B and B readsFor A. This means that, in general, if you want to encrypt a message to A, but for whatever reason it's cheaper to encrypt a message for B, it's safe to just use B instead, and vice versa.

In total, A equivalent B when A readsSameAs B and A signsSameAs B. This means that (in general) A and B can be used interchangeably.

Composition¶

There are a variety of ways to refer to groups of identities as single, larger identities.

Threshold Composition¶

Suppose we want an identity M that refers to any majority from a set of shareholders. A signature from M would require that a majority of shareholders participated in signing, and encrypting information for M would require that a majority of shareholders participate in decryption. To construct M, we start with a set of shareholder identities, each paired with a weight (their share), and define a weight threshold which specifies the minimum weight for a "majority."

There are several ways we could imagine constructing Threshold Composition Identities, but without specifying anything about the underlying identities:

• A threshold composition identity signature is a map from (hashes of) external identities, to signatures. To verify a signature for some message x, we verify each signature with x and its external identity, and check that the weights of the external identities sum to at least the threshold.

• A threshold composition identity encrypted message is a map from (hashes of) external identities, to ciphertexts. To decrypt, any subset of internal identities with weights summing to at least the threshold must decrypt their corresponding ciphertexts, and the resulting plaintexts must be combined using an erasure coding scheme.

Threshold Composition Juvix Type (Signer and verifier)¶

A ThresholdCompose VerifierType consists of a threshold (Nat), and a set of VerifierTypes, each paired with a weight (Nat). (this set is encoded as a Map.map from hashes of verifiers to Pair Nat VerifierType pairs). Commitments are simply Maps from hashes of the underlying identities to Commitments signed by that identitity. A Commitment verifies iff the set of valid Commitments included correspond to a set of verifiers whose weights sum to at least the threshold. Note that this satisfies both signatures Verifier and Signer.

In general, ThresholdCompose SignerTypes and VerifierTypes may not be used much directly. Instead, nodes can make more efficient identities (using cryptographic signature aggregation techniques), and express their relationship to ThresholdCompose VerifierTypes as a SignsFor relationship. This will let nodes reason about identities using simple ThresholdCompose VerifierTypes, while actually using more efficient implementations.

Formally, to specify a ThresholdCompose, we need:

• verifier, the structure of the underlying Verifiers.

• signer, the corresponding structure of the underlying Signers.

• map : OrdMap, to be used to encode weights and Commitments. (Note that this needs the OrdKey to be the hash type of the underlying verifier)

• thresholdComposeHash, which specifies a hash function that can hash our composed VerifierTypes (type ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon).

type ComposeHashable (VerifierType : Type) (MapCon : Type -> Type) :=
  mkComposeHashable@{
    threshold : Nat;
    weights : MapCon (Pair Nat VerifierType);
  };

A ThresholdCompose structure provides:

• map : OrdMap the underlying OrdMap used in VerifierType and Commitment

• underlyingVerifier : Verifier the structure describing the types of the underlying VerifierTypes which can be composed.

• underlyingSigner : Signer the structure describing the types of the underlying SignerTypes which can be composed.

• VerifierHash : HASH describes the hash function for hashing these composed verifiers

• The SignerType type of the composed verifiers is the type of composed signers. These are just MapCon Commitment, meaning each is stored under the hash of the corresponding VerifierType. This SignerType does not need to encode weights or threshold.

• The VerifierType type of composed verifiers. These are ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon

• The Signable type , being the type of message that can be signed. This is exactly the same as what the underlying verifiers can sign (Signable of underlyingVerifier).

• The Commitment type describes composed signatures, these are a MapCon from hashes of underlying verifiers to signatures (Commitment of underlyingVerifier)

• The sign function creates a Commitment using all underlyingSigner SignerTypes in the composed SignerType.

• The verify function returns true iff the set of valid Commitments included correspond to a set of underlyingVerifier VerifierTypes whose weights sum to at least the threshold.

• The signerCompose function constructs a composed SignerType from a list of Pair VerifierType SignerType pairs. Note that each SignerType must be paired with its correct VerifierType, or the composed SignerType will not produce verifiable Commitments.

• The verifierCompose function is useful for constructing the composition of a list of verifiers. Returns a composed VerifierType. Its arguments are:

  • the threshold (Nat)
  • a list of weights(Nat), VerifierType pairs.

• The verifierAnd function creates a composed VerifierType that is the "&&" of two input verifiers: a SignerType must encode the information of the signers for both x and y to sign statements verifierAnd x y will verify.

• The verifierOr function creates a composed VerifierType that is the "||" of two input verifiers: a SignerType must encode the information of the signers for either x or y to sign statements verifierOr x y will verify.

type ThresholdCompose (OrdKey : Type) (MapCon : Type
  -> Type) (VerifierType Signable Commitment SignerType VerifierHashOrdKeyType : Type) :=
  mkThresholdCompose@{
    map : OrdMap OrdKey MapCon;
    underlyingVerifier : Verifier OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment;
    underlyingSigner : Signer SignerType Signable Commitment;
    verifierHash
      : HASH VerifierHashOrdKeyType (ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon);
    sign : MapCon SignerType -> Signable -> MapCon Commitment;
    verify
      : ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon
        -> Signable
        -> MapCon Commitment
        -> Bool;
    signerCompose : List (Pair VerifierType SignerType) -> MapCon SignerType;
    verifierCompose
      : Nat
        -> List (Pair Nat VerifierType)
        -> ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon;
    verifierAnd
      : VerifierType -> VerifierType -> ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon;
    verifierOr
      : VerifierType -> VerifierType -> ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon;
  };

projectVerifier
  {MapCon : Type -> Type}
  {OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment SignerType VerifierHashOrdKeyType : Type}
  (tc : ThresholdCompose
    OrdKey
    MapCon
    VerifierType
    Signable
    Commitment
    SignerType
    VerifierHashOrdKeyType)
  : Verifier
    VerifierHashOrdKeyType
    (ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon)
    Signable
    (MapCon Commitment) :=
  Verifier.mkVerifier@{
    verify := ThresholdCompose.verify tc;
    verifierHash := ThresholdCompose.verifierHash tc;
  };

ThresholdComposeFunctor
  {MapCon : Type -> Type}
  {OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment SignerType VerifierHashOrdKeyType : Type}
  (verifier : Verifier OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment)
  (signer : Signer SignerType Signable Commitment)
  (mapIn : OrdMap OrdKey MapCon)
  (thresholdComposeHash : HASH
    VerifierHashOrdKeyType
    (ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon))
  : ThresholdCompose
    OrdKey
    MapCon
    VerifierType
    Signable
    Commitment
    SignerType
    VerifierHashOrdKeyType :=
  ThresholdCompose.mkThresholdCompose@{
    map := mapIn;
    underlyingVerifier := verifier;
    underlyingSigner := signer;
    verifierHash := thresholdComposeHash;
    sign := \{s m := OrdMap.map map \{i := Signer.sign underlyingSigner i m} s};
    verify :=
      \{| (ComposeHashable.mkComposeHashable t ws) s c :=
        t
          <= OrdMap.foldl
            map
            \{(mkPair x y) := x + y}
            0
            (OrdMap.intersectWith
              map
              \{| (mkPair (mkPair w v) x) :=
                if 
                  | Verifier.verify underlyingVerifier v s x := w
                  | else := 0}
              (mkPair ws c))};
    signerCompose :=
      \{l :=
        foldl
          \{m (mkPair v s) :=
            OrdMap.insert
              map
              (mkPair
                m
                (mkPair
                  (HASH.hash (Verifier.verifierHash underlyingVerifier) v)
                  s))}
          (OrdMap.empty map)
          l};
    verifierCompose :=
      \{threshold weights :=
        ComposeHashable.mkComposeHashable
          threshold
          (foldl
            \{m (mkPair w v) :=
              OrdMap.insert
                map
                (mkPair
                  m
                  (mkPair
                    (HASH.hash (Verifier.verifierHash underlyingVerifier) v)
                    (mkPair w v)))}
            (OrdMap.empty map)
            weights)};
    verifierAnd := \{x y := verifierCompose 2 [mkPair 1 x; mkPair 1 y]};
    verifierOr := \{x y := verifierCompose 1 [mkPair 1 x; mkPair 1 y]};
  };

While this construction is rather naive, it is general, and crucially, we can reason about equivalence with any number of more interesting schemes:

• We can show that a threshold RSA signature scheme signsSameAs as a Threshold Composition Identity.

• We can show that a secret sharing scheme readsSameAs a Threshold Composition Identity.

By phrasing our discussion in terms of equivalence and Threshold Composition Identities, we can abstract over the actual cryptography used. We can also derive some signsFor and readsFor relations that must hold, by looking at the relations that must hold for Threshold Composition Identities:

signsFor Threshold Composition¶

Like any identity, Threshold Composition Identities can define any number of ways to delegate signing power, or be delegated signing power. However, some cases should always hold: A signsFor B if every identity in A has no more weight (divided by threshold) than identities it signsFor in B. This implies that any collection of identities that can sign as A can also sign as B.

A signsFor relation for easy comparison of ThresholdCompose VerifierTypes x signsFor y if every underlying VerifierType in x has no more weight (divided by threshold) as verifiers it signsFor in y. This implies that anything which can sign as x can also sign as y.

This requires an underlying S : SignsFor for comparing the weighted signers in x and y, which in turn may require evidence. No additional evidence is required.

Other parameters necessary to define the ThresholdCompose verifiers include:

• signer, the corresponding structure of the underlying signers.

• map : OrdMap, to be used to encode weights and Commitments. (Note that this needs OrdKey to be the hash type of the underlying verifier)

• thresholdComposeHash, which specifies a hash function that can hash our composed VerifierTypes (type ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon).

type ThresholdComposeSignsFor (OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Evidence : Type) (MapCon : Type
  -> Type) VerifierHashOrdKeyType :=
  mkThresholdComposeSignsFor@{
    underlyingSignsFor
      : SignsFor OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Evidence;
    verifier
      : ThresholdCompose
        OrdKey
        MapCon
        VerifierType
        Signable
        Commitment
        VerifierType
        VerifierHashOrdKeyType;
    signsFor
      : Evidence
        -> Pair
          (ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon)
          (ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon)
        -> Bool;
  };

projectSignsFor
  {OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Evidence}
  {MapCon : Type -> Type}
  {VerifierHashOrdKeyType : Type}
  (tc : ThresholdComposeSignsFor
    OrdKey
    VerifierType
    Signable
    Commitment
    Evidence
    MapCon
    VerifierHashOrdKeyType)
  : SignsFor
    VerifierHashOrdKeyType
    (ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon)
    Signable
    (MapCon Commitment)
    Evidence :=
  SignsFor.mkSignsFor@{
    verifier := projectVerifier (ThresholdComposeSignsFor.verifier tc);
    signsFor := ThresholdComposeSignsFor.signsFor tc;
  };

ThresholdComposeSignsForFunctor
  {OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Evidence}
  {MapCon : Type -> Type}
  {VerifierHashOrdKeyType : Type}
  (S : SignsFor OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Evidence)
  (signer : Signer VerifierType Signable Commitment)
  (map : OrdMap OrdKey MapCon)
  (thresholdComposeHash : HASH
    VerifierHashOrdKeyType
    (ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon))
  : ThresholdComposeSignsFor
    OrdKey
    VerifierType
    Signable
    Commitment
    Evidence
    MapCon
    VerifierHashOrdKeyType :=
  ThresholdComposeSignsFor.mkThresholdComposeSignsFor@{
    underlyingSignsFor := S;
    verifier :=
      ThresholdComposeFunctor
        (SignsFor.verifier underlyingSignsFor)
        signer
        map
        thresholdComposeHash;
    signsFor :=
      \{e (mkPair (ComposeHashable.mkComposeHashable t0 w0) (ComposeHashable.mkComposeHashable t1 w1)) :=
        OrdMap.all
          map
          \{(mkPair w v) :=
            w * t1
              <= OrdMap.foldl
                  map
                  \{(mkPair (mkPair x v1) s) :=
                    if 
                      | SignsFor.signsFor underlyingSignsFor e (mkPair v v1) :=
                        x + s
                      | else := s}
                  0
                  w1
                * t0}
          w0};
  };

Encryptor Threshold Composition¶

DANGER: NOT YET IMPLEMENTED

Implementing this requires secret sharing. The threshold composed encryptor is a threshold, and a set of weights paired with UnderlyingEncryptor.encryptors. There are stored in a Map.map under their hashes, to ensure uniqueness.

The idea is that an encrypted plaintext should only be decryptable by a decryptor that encodes the information from a set of decryptors corresponding to a set of encryptors whose weight sums to at least the threshold.

type ThresholdComposeEncryptor (OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext : Type) (MapCon : Type
  -> Type) (EncryptorHashOrdKeyType : Type) :=
  mkThresholdComposeEncryptor@{
    map : OrdMap OrdKey MapCon;
    underlyingEncryptor : Encryptor OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext;
    encryptorHash
      : HASH EncryptorHashOrdKeyType (ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon);
    compose
      : Nat
        -> List (Pair Nat EncryptorType)
        -> ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon;
    encrypt : ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon -> Plaintext -> Ciphertext;
  };

projectEncryptor
  {OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext}
  {MapCon : Type -> Type}
  {EncryptorHashOrdKeyType}
  (tc : ThresholdComposeEncryptor
    OrdKey
    EncryptorType
    Plaintext
    Ciphertext
    MapCon
    EncryptorHashOrdKeyType)
  : Encryptor
    EncryptorHashOrdKeyType
    (ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon)
    Plaintext
    Ciphertext :=
  Encryptor.mkEncryptor@{
    encrypt := ThresholdComposeEncryptor.encrypt tc;
    encryptorHash := ThresholdComposeEncryptor.encryptorHash tc;
  };

axiom encrypt_DUMMY
  {EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext}
  {MapCon}
  : ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon -> Plaintext -> Ciphertext;

ThresholdComposeEncryptorFunctor
  {OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext}
  {MapCon : Type -> Type}
  {EncryptorHashOrdKeyType}
  (encryptor : Encryptor OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext)
  (mapIn : OrdMap OrdKey MapCon)
  (thresholdComposeHash : HASH
    EncryptorHashOrdKeyType
    (ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon))
  : ThresholdComposeEncryptor
    OrdKey
    EncryptorType
    Plaintext
    Ciphertext
    MapCon
    EncryptorHashOrdKeyType :=
  ThresholdComposeEncryptor.mkThresholdComposeEncryptor@{
    map := mapIn;
    underlyingEncryptor := encryptor;
    encryptorHash := thresholdComposeHash;
    compose :=
      \{t w :=
        ComposeHashable.mkComposeHashable@{
          threshold := t;
          weights :=
            foldl
              \{m (mkPair w e) :=
                OrdMap.insert
                  map
                  (mkPair
                    m
                    (mkPair
                      (HASH.hash
                        (Encryptor.encryptorHash underlyingEncryptor)
                        e)
                      (mkPair w e)))}
              (OrdMap.empty map)
              w;
        }};
    encrypt := encrypt_DUMMY;
  };

readsFor Threshold Composition¶

Like any identity, ThresholdCompositionIdentities can have arbitrary readsFor relationships. However, some cases should always hold : A readsFor B if every identity in A has no more weight (divided by threshold) than identities it readsFor in B. This implies that any collection of identities that can read messages encrypted with A can also read messages encrypted as B.

A readsFor relation for easy comparison of ThresholdComposeEncryptor EncryptorTypes x readsFor y if every underlying EncryptorType in x has no more weight (divided by threshold) as encryptors it readsFor in y. This implies that anything which can decrypt as x can also decrypt as y.

This requires an underlying R : ReadsFor for comparing the weighted encryptors in x and y, which in turn may require evidence. No additional evidence is required.

type ThresholdComposeReadsFor (OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext Evidence : Type) (MapCon : Type
  -> Type) (EncryptorHashOrdKeyType : Type) :=
  mkThresholdComposeReadsFor@{
    underlyingReadsFor
      : ReadsFor OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext Evidence;
    encryptor
      : ThresholdComposeEncryptor
        OrdKey
        EncryptorType
        Plaintext
        Ciphertext
        MapCon
        EncryptorHashOrdKeyType;
    readsFor
      : Evidence
        -> Pair
          (ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon)
          (ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon)
        -> Bool;
  };

projectReadsFor
  {OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Evidence}
  {MapCon : Type -> Type}
  {EncryptorHashOrdKeyType : Type}
  (tc : ThresholdComposeReadsFor
    OrdKey
    VerifierType
    Signable
    Commitment
    Evidence
    MapCon
    EncryptorHashOrdKeyType)
  : ReadsFor
    EncryptorHashOrdKeyType
    (ComposeHashable VerifierType MapCon)
    Signable
    Commitment
    Evidence :=
  ReadsFor.mkReadsFor@{
    encryptor := projectEncryptor (ThresholdComposeReadsFor.encryptor tc);
    readsFor := ThresholdComposeReadsFor.readsFor tc;
  };

ThresholdComposeReadsForFunctor
  {OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext Evidence}
  {MapCon : Type -> Type}
  {EncryptorHashOrdKeyType}
  (r : ReadsFor OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext Evidence)
  (map : OrdMap OrdKey MapCon)
  (thresholdComposeHash : HASH
    EncryptorHashOrdKeyType
    (ComposeHashable EncryptorType MapCon))
  : ThresholdComposeReadsFor
    OrdKey
    EncryptorType
    Plaintext
    Ciphertext
    Evidence
    MapCon
    EncryptorHashOrdKeyType :=
  ThresholdComposeReadsFor.mkThresholdComposeReadsFor@{
    underlyingReadsFor := r;
    encryptor :=
      ThresholdComposeEncryptorFunctor
        (ReadsFor.encryptor underlyingReadsFor)
        map
        thresholdComposeHash;
    readsFor :=
      \{e (mkPair (ComposeHashable.mkComposeHashable t0 w0) (ComposeHashable.mkComposeHashable t1 w1)) :=
        OrdMap.all
          map
          \{(mkPair w v) :=
            w * t1
              <= OrdMap.foldl
                  map
                  \{(mkPair (mkPair x v1) s) :=
                    if 
                      | ReadsFor.readsFor underlyingReadsFor e (mkPair v v1) :=
                        x + s
                      | else := s}
                  0
                  w1
                * t0}
          w0};
  };

"And" Identities¶

We can compose identities with conjunction: A && B is the identity which requires an agent to have both A's internal identity and B's internal identity to sign or decrypt. It represents A and B working together. In practice, A && B can be defined as a special case of Threshold composition (see verifierAnd above).

"Or" Identities¶

We can compose identities with disjunction as well: A || B requires an agent to have either A's internal identity or B's internal identity. It represents either A or B, without specifying which. In practice, A || B can be defined as a special case of Threshold Composition (see verifierOr above).

In principle, we could define things differently: Threshold Composition could be defined using && and || as primitives, by building a disjunction of every possible conjunction that satisfies the threshold. In several important cases, however, this takes much more space to express, so we use the equally general and more numerically efficient threshold composition abstraction.

Opaque Composition¶

A group of agents can also compose an opaque identity such that composition information is not available to the outside. One example would be using distributed key generation and a threshold cryptosystem e.g. Threshold RSA. Here the agents compute one RSA keypair together, with only shares of the private key being generated by each agent. Decryption of messages encrypted to the single public key then requires cooperation of a subset of agents holding key shares, fulfilling the threshold requirements. This group would have a single External Identity based on a regular RSA public key, and it would not necessarily be clear how the identity was composed.

Specific evidence could prove that this threshold cryptosystem identity is equivalent to some ThresholdCompose identity. This kind of proof requires readsFor and signsFor relations tailored to the cryptosystem used. Once equivalence is proven, however, one could use the threshold cryptosystem identity for efficiency, but reason using the ThresholdCompose identity.

Special identities¶

The following special identities illustrate the generality of our identity abstractions:

"true / All"¶

Anyone can sign and decrypt (verify returns true and encrypt returns the Plaintext). No secret knowledge is required, so all agents can take on this identity.

The true identity preserves structure under conjunction (x && true equivalent x) and forgets structure under disjunction (x || true equivalent true).

"false / None"¶

No one can sign or decrypt (verify returns false and encrypt returns empty string). No secret knowledge exists that fulfills these requirements, so no agent can take on this identity.

The false identity forgets structure under disjunction (x && false equivalent false) and preserves structure under disjunction (x || false equivalent x).

Identity Names¶

Sometimes it is useful to have a name for an external identity before the relevant cryptographic values are available. For example, we might refer to "a quorum of validators from chain X at epoch Y". Before epoch Y has begun, chain X may not have yet decided who constitutes a quorum.

It would be possible to build a Verifier, where the evidence that the signers are in fact a quorum of validators from chain X at epoch Y is part of the signature. One might later build a simpler Verifier, which elides this evidence, and then prove that the two signsSameAs using the evidence. However, barring some really exciting cryptography, we'd need to know the quorums from chain X at epoch Y before we could make an Encryptor.

We therefore introduce a new type, Identity Name, which represents a placeholder to be filled in when an appropriate external identity can be found. Specifically, each type of identity name comes with a predicate, which can be satisfied by an external identity, and accompanying evidence. Identity names can also be hashed, like external identities.

Identity names can be described in two structures: one for checking that a VerifierType corresponds with an IdentityName, and one for checking that an EncryptorType corresponds with an IdentityName. The same name can refer to both a VerifierType and an EncryptorType.

Verifier Name Juvix Type¶

An IdentityName can be mapped to an appropriate VerifierType when suitable Evidence is found. Here, checkVerifierName defines what evidence is acceptable for a VerifierType.

Note that IdentityNames are also hashable: we require a structure verifierNameHash that details how to hash them.

type VerifierName OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Evidence IdentityName VerifierNameHashOrdKeyType :=
  mkVerifierName@{
    verifier : Verifier OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment;
    checkVerifierName : IdentityName -> VerifierType -> Evidence -> Bool;
    verifierNameHash : HASH VerifierNameHashOrdKeyType IdentityName;
  };

Encryptor Name Juvix Type¶

An IdentityName can be mapped to an appropriate Encryptor EncryptorType when suitable Evidence is found. Here, checkEncryptorName defines what evidence is acceptable for an Encryptor EncryptorType. Note that IdentityNames are also hashable: we require a structure encryptorNameHash that details how to hash them.

type EncryptorName OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext Evidence IdentityName EncryptorNameHashOrdKeyType :=
  mkEncryptorName@{
    verifier : Encryptor OrdKey EncryptorType Plaintext Ciphertext;
    checkEncryptorName : IdentityName -> EncryptorType -> Evidence -> Bool;
    encryptorNameHash : HASH EncryptorNameHashOrdKeyType IdentityName;
  };

For example, for the identity name "a quorum of validators from chain X at epoch Y", a satisfying external identity would be composed from the validators selected for epoch Y, and the accompanying evidence would be a light-client proof from chain X that these are the correct validators for epoch Y.

Note that multiple identity names can refer to the same external identity, and in principle, multiple external identities could have the same identity name. Usually, multiple external identities only have the same identity name when there is Byzantine behaviour, but that is not explicitly part of the identity abstractions at this layer.

Sub-Identities¶

One particularly common case for identity names is when one party (the super-identity) wants to designate a specific name they use to refer to another identity. Here, the super-identity is acting like a certificate authority: they designate which external identity corresponds with this identity name. This sub-identity is often something the super-identity controls: a specific machine they own, or a process they run on that machine. Such a sub-identity might be associated with a string, such as "acceptor", which might designate the process participating in consensus within a validator. In this case, the predicate should check that the super-identity has signed a statement declaring that the external identity matches the sub-identity.

"." Notation¶

Because sub-identities using string names are so common, we have a short-cut notation for expressing identity names. Given some identity Alice, for any string "foo", Alice.foo is an identity name. For example, even before they learn anything about Alice, validators might refer to Alice.acceptor to mean the specific process Alice is running to participate in consensus. The identity Alice can sign statements to let people know what external identity they should (immutably) use for Alice.foo or Alice.acceptor. These are left associative, so Alice.foo can designate Alice.foo.bar (shorthand for (Alice.foo).bar) and Alice.foo.bar can designate Alice.foo.bar.baz (shorthand for ((Alice.foo).bar).baz), and so on. These are a special case of sub-identities: X.Y is a sub-identity of X.

Formally, we use mkPair (hash Alice) "foo" as the Juvix representation of Alice.foo:

A specific kind of identity name, wher ethe evidence is a signed statement from a specified parent saying that it associates this VerifierType with a specific name.

Here,

• Name is the type the parent identifies with a child. For example, for name = string, and some identity Alice, we can specify (hash(Alice),"bob"), or Alice.bob, as the identity that Alice refers to as "bob".

• child : Verifier type that can be identified with a name.

• parent : Verifier type that signs evidence statements.

  Crucially, it must be able to sign tuples of the form (string, name, child's hash type) In our example, where Alice refers to Bob as Alice."bob", child describes Bob, parent describes Alice, and name describes "bob".

• hash Describes what will become the verifierNameHash. Crucially, it must be able to hash pairs of the form (parent's hash type, name)

SubVerifierFunctor
  (OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment Name ParentOrdKeyType : Type)
  (child : Verifier OrdKey VerifierType Signable Commitment)
  (parent : Verifier
    ParentOrdKeyType
    VerifierType
    (Pair String (Pair Name OrdKey))
    Commitment)
  (hash : HASH ParentOrdKeyType (Pair ParentOrdKeyType Name))
  : VerifierName
    OrdKey
    VerifierType
    Signable
    Commitment
    (Pair VerifierType Commitment)
    (Pair ParentOrdKeyType Name)
    ParentOrdKeyType :=
  VerifierName.mkVerifierName@{
    verifier := child;
    checkVerifierName :=
      \{(mkPair ph n) c (mkPair pv pc) :=
        Verifier.verify
            parent
            pv
            (mkPair
              "I identify this verifier with this name : "
              (mkPair n (HASH.hash (Verifier.verifierHash child) c)))
            pc
          && OrdKey.compare
              (HASH.ordKey (Verifier.verifierHash parent))
              ph
              (HASH.hash (Verifier.verifierHash parent) pv)
            == Equal};
    verifierNameHash := hash;
  };

In other words, we have a specific, standardized thing an external identity can sign to designate that another external identity corresponds to a "." name.

Note that we can use "." sub-identities for purposes other than identifying identities that the super-identity controls. Alice might have a friend Bob, and designate his external identity as Alice.bob. This is an example of a place where "sub-identity-ness" is not transitive: Alice.bob.carol is (Alice.bob).carol, a sub-identity of Alice.bob, so it is up to Bob to designate which external identity he associates with "carol", and Alice has no say: Alice.bob.carol is not a sub-identity of Alice.

Identity Engine¶

In practice, using Identity Names requires each physical machine to maintain a mapping from identity names to known external identities. The machine does not have to store the accompanying evidence for each, although it might be useful to do so sometimes (for example, in order to present to a third party). When any process on that machine wants to do any operation using an identity name instead of an external identity, it can query this mapping to see if there is a known external identity to use for that operation.

An Identity Engine can also store evidence for known signsFor and readsFor relationships, and help choose which external identity is most efficient for a task. For example, if an agent wants to encrypt a message to "a quorum of validators from chain X at epoch Y", they would first resolving the identity name to an identity (possibly a Threshold Composed Identity), and might then ask if there is some known equivalent identity (such as a threshold encryption identity) with cheaper encryption.

Identity Name Resolution¶

There is no general mechanism for finding external identities (and accompanying evidence) for arbitrary identity names, with arbitrary forms of evidence. However, for some common types of identity names, such as "." sub-identities, we can establish a standard server and query language, which participating Identity Engines can query to resolve those identity names.